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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: A Selective Study on Effectiveness of International
Legislation on Maritime Security: Gulf of Guinea A Case
Study

Degree:

MSc

The dissertation is a selective study on effective international legislation to enhance
maritime security globally. It compares the effectiveness of the international legal
regimes among member States and the Gulf of Guinea countries in combating piracy,
armed robbery and terrorism against ships.

A brief look is taken at the present maritime security rules and regulations as well as
their evolvement over the years. The definition of maritime security and the role of
the ISPS Code 2002 in the global war on terror are examined, while considering the
state of the economy and maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea.

The effectiveness of international legislation and its impacts on enhancing maritime
security are investigated. Concerns from IMO member States on achieving uniform
standards in enforcing the security regimes are explored with a view to ascertaining
the manner in which the regulations can best be used to combat acts of piracy,
armed robbery and terrorism. Particular reference is made to the USA maritime
security initiatives, CMI Model Law and multinational coalition naval forces in
maritime security operations.

Implementation of the range of provisions in the UNCLOS, SUA Convention and
ISPS Code on enhancing maritime security in developed and developing countries,
together with their constraints are explored.

Several factors are identified as

hindering the effectiveness of the Code in the countries in the Gulf of Guinea,
particularly in Nigeria. These constraints are analyzed, to find a way forward in the
effective implementation of the ISPS Code and other regulatory regimes in the region.
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Additionally, the current trend in the increase of acts of piracy and terrorism globally,
as reported by the IMB, the maritime security assessment and responses by member
States were noted for comparison. The provisions in the regulatory regimes were
collated and evaluated on enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

The concluding chapters examine the results of the assessment of ISPS Code in the
Gulf of Guinea and discuss the strategies for effectiveness of the Code in the region,
particularly in Nigeria.

Conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made

concerning the need for domestication of the ISPS Code and other international legal
regimes for effective maritime security in Nigeria.

KEYWORDS: Effectiveness, international Legislation, UNCLOS, SUA Convention,
SOLAS Convention, ISPS Code, Maritime Security, Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Background

The success of maritime security depends largely on the ability of nations to provide
adequate legal regimes in support of the shipping industry. Sea transportation is as
old as civilization itself and commercial shipping probably began in the
Mediterranean Sea where the Merchants of Phoenicia owned ships and traded
widely. Progressively, the design of ships has moved from those rowed and sailed to
the diesel, steam and gas turbines as well as nuclear-powered vessels of today. Not
only has the propulsion engine power increased, but also the total carrying capacity.
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2005, P.271), about 90 per cent of
the annual global trade by volume is moved by ships.

Being a complex system with very high technological architecture, the ship is one of
the most ingenious inventions of man. A modern design is an integration of complex
systems in separated and modular forms which include the components of propulsion,
communication, navigation equipment as well as accommodation systems among
others. The use of them for transporting of passengers and bulk goods is one of the
cheapest modes of transportation. Despite the economic benefits derived from their
use for transportation of goods and services, there are also some challenges, the
most significant of which are maritime safety and security.

Recent events in the world have raised the concern of the international community
regarding the safety and security of ships at sea.

Piracy, armed robbery and

terrorism and insurgency have constituted the greatest threat to maritime security.
According to the report of International maritime Organization (IMO, 2009), the surge
on the act of piracy globally is attributable to the increase in piratical attacks in the
Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean. The report shows also there has been an increase
in piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea since 1982. Resulting from the effort of
Japan in the newly-formed Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy
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(ReCAAP) in the Southeast Asia and Malasia, Singapore and Indonesia in the
MALSINDO Initiatives in Straits of Malacca; there is a remarkable reduction of piracy
and armed robbery against ships in the waters within this region of the South China
Sea and Indian Ocean.

Similar reports indicate an increase in the acts of terrorism in the world, starting from
the incident in 1985 which involved the passenger ship Achillo Lauro that was
hijacked by terrorist in the Mediterranean.

Thereafter, there have been terrorist

attacks on US Navy Ship (USS) Cole at Aden Yemen on October 2000, Merchant
Tanker (MT) Limburg off the coast of Yemen on October 2002 and Super ferry 14 in
Philippine waters on February 2004. The uppermost concern for maritime security
was expressed over the incident of terrorism in the United States (US) on 11
September 2001 (9/11), which involved the use of passenger airlines. In its wake
was the incident in Madrid on 11 March 2004 in which commercial trains were also
the target of terrorism. The global concern with maritime security is based on the
premise that terrorists, having already targeted air and rail successfully, would exploit
the use of commercial ships. If this were to be the case, the consequences of such
an act would be enormous considering the population density at the seaports and the
global economic reach of the sea.

In order to reposition the maritime industry to ensure successful trading and
continuous economic growth in the world, the United Nations (UN) and the IMO have
developed a legal framework to address the issues of safety and security at sea.
Among the legislation are the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (1974)
As Amended and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). Others
are International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Marine Navigation and Protocol (1988) as well as the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code (2002).

1.2.

Statement of the Problem

Shipping and its socio-economic effect on global trade are under increasing threats.
The report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB, 2009), a specialized division of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), states that the rate of crimes is
increasing in the maritime industry. Specifically, the number of piratical attacks on
ships has recently risen tremendously in the Gulf of Aden off the coasts of Somalia
and Yemen. From the IMB report, the number of piratical attacks increased from 48
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in 2007 to 111 in 2008, which is over 100 per cent increase. This is despite the
existence of the international community legislation and coalition armed forces to
combat crimes at sea. It is in the light of this global increase in maritime crimes such
as terrorism and piracy that this study is being conducted, to establish the
effectiveness of the international legal regimes in enhancing maritime security.
1.3.

Objectives of the Study

The broad aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of international legal
framework on maritime security. The specific objectives will be to:
•

Identify the threats to maritime security and its relationship with the
international legislation.

•

Examine the impact of maritime security threats on the shipping industry.

•

Critically analyze the international legal regimes for enhancing maritime
security.

•

Evaluate the effects of the international legal regimes using data and trend
analyses.

•

Identify the constraints of the international legal regimes that have militated
against ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

•

Proffer strategies for the effective implementation of the maritime security
legislation the Gulf of Guinea.

1.4.

Significance of the Study

In examining data on breaches of maritime security, the study seeks to bring to light
the trends that can be associated with security legislation and the ISPS Code in
particular. It is intended that such data analyses and critical evaluation of the legal
instruments will assist in improving policy-making for maritime security at the
international, regional and local levels.
1.5.

Scope

The dissertation will highlight the trend in the international regime for providing
security at sea in the past 15 years. This period is divided into 2 phases. The first
phase is the period between 1994 and 2001 during which the UNCLOS and SUA
Convention came into force.

The second phase is the period between 2002

3

and 2009 when the SOLAS Chapter XI As Amended and ISPS Code 2002 came also
into force.

This development in the legislation is to adequately address the

differences on the issues of maritime security and safety.

1.6.

Methodology

The international legislative regimes which have been developed over the years to
enhance maritime security will be critically analyzed using statistical approach.
Among the legal regimes to be analyzed are UNCLOS, SUA Convention and
Protocol, SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code.

Data on threats to maritime security will be gathered from both primary and
secondary sources. The primary data will be predominantly gathered from the IMB, a
non-profit making organization established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight
against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. The data from this organization
seem therefore to be reasonably unbiased and is arguably the entity with the most
significant data collection of unlawful acts at sea. Other data are from the Nigerian
Shippers Council (NSC) as well as information and literature review sources
including the Internet. Furthermore, the study will adopt quantitative methods and
statistical approaches in analyzing the data.
1.7.

Limitations

The limitation of this research was the dearth of up-to-date on maritime security in
the countries of West Africa, particularly in Nigeria. This is to a large extent due to
the low level of maritime domain awareness in the region. However, information
obtained from senior officers in the maritime industry and the data from the IMB are
crucial to this study, so this limitation did not significantly affect the outcome of the
study.

4

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY

This section will undertake the review of the literature relevant to the study and will
provide a theoretical framework on which the work is based.

The concept of

maritime security will be discussed to establish a common definition that will be
adopted throughout the study. It look at concepts on the threats to security such as
piracy, armed robbery, terrorism, insurgency and other organized crimes at sea as
well as the concept of maritime zones delimitation. It will also examine the literature
in law to define the term code which will be appropriate for the understanding of the
ISPS Code in the context of maritime security.

2.1.

Maritime Security

The Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (2005) defines “maritime” as pertaining to the
sea, to navigation, to shipping commerce and bordering on the sea. Ma (2008)
states broadly that maritime covers many aspects related to the sea often beyond
purely transportation. Also, the USA Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2005)
defines maritime as a domain covering all the areas and things bordering on a sea
and other navigational waterways including all sea-related activities, infrastructure,
people, cargo, vessels and other conveyances. These definitions of maritime will
suffice in this paper, but it will include all human and commercial activities carried out
in harbours and at sea which would require a secure environment.

The definition of security is as wide and complex as its concept. Some scholars
maintain that safety and security are synonymous, since both refer to a state of being
safe from fear, danger, anxiety and uncertainty. Other scholars insist that the words
are distinct from each other. It is to underline the distinction between safety and
security that Mejia (2003, p.154) opined that from a linguistic perspective, both words
as expressed in some languages may lead to terminological confusion. For example
in French, the words safety and security are expressed in a word “securite”, while in
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Spanish both words are expressed in the word “seguridad”. Both of these languages
are among the 6 official languages within the UN system. On the other hand in
English, the 2 words are expressed literally in different as well as distinct terms.

In order to resolve the confusion arising from the meaning of safety and security, due
to differences in the languages of the world, the international community has agreed
to distinguish between their meanings. This is to ensure a global uniformity in the
definitions.

Mejia et al (2005, p.34) define maritime safety as those measures

employed by maritime administrations, vessel owners and operators, port facilities,
offshore installations and other maritime organizations to prevent as well as minimize
the occurrence of accidents at sea. 1

However, the term “maritime safety” is in

contrast with the term “maritime security” being used at IMO, indicating the terms are
quite distinct in meaning. Therefore, Mejia et al define maritime security as those
measures employed by administrations, vessel owners and operators, port facilities,
offshore installations and other maritime organizations to protect against unlawful
acts such as piracy, armed robbery, terrorism as well as other maritime crimes.

In addition to these definitions, therefore, by maritime safety this paper implies all the
measures taken to protect the ship and its crew from accidents occurring within the
operational activities onboard ships due to propulsion control machinery failure and
navigational error among others.

Similarly, maritime security would imply all

measures taken to protect the ship and its crew from attacks from external agents
during the ship’s operations.
2.2.

Maritime Security Threats

The list of threats to maritime security is long and new trends keep evolving globally.
From the foregoing definitions, the threats are human illegal activities employed to
militate against the measures taken to ensure maritime security.

Among these

threats are piracy and armed robbery against ships, terrorism, insurgency and
smuggling.

Others are human and drug trafficking, arms running, stowaways,

counterfeit and fraud.

1

The accidents could result from substandard ships, unqualified crew and operator error.
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2.3.

Piracy

Over the years, the oceans of the world have a long history of maritime piracy.
People have been romanticising piracy as the Robin Hoods of the Sea. Pirates are
seen as likeable bearded characters who steal from the rich to give to the poor. In
reality, it is quite different: piracy is a violent and bloody attack targeted on
defenceless people onboard merchant vessels. Currently, the acts of piracy are
been carried out with sophisticated weapons and at coastal waters, making them to
deviate from their original meaning as acts being carried out for personal financial
gains at high sea. According to Article 101 of UNCLOS 1982, piracy consists of any
of the following acts:

(a)

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passenger of a private
ship or a private aircraft and directed:
(i)

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft;

(ii)

against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any State;

(b)

any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c)

any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) and (b).

This Article goes further to state the five elements of an act of piracy which are as
follows: (1) an act of violence crime resulting to assault, rape and murder among
others; (2) an act committed on the high seas or places outside the jurisdiction of any
State; (3) an act involving the use of a ship to attack another ship, excluding mutiny
and barratry; (4) an act committed for private ends, which excludes the acts of
terrorism and environmental damage activities. (5) an act by the crew or passengers
of a privately owned ship which excludes attack from a naval ship. This UNCLOS
definition of acts of piracy is narrow considering that it fails to cover some of the
current acts of piracy. When one considers the piratical attacks in the region of the
Gulf of Guinea, it is clear that most of these attacks occur within the 12 nautical miles
which is in the territorial waters limit.

This is in contrast to the high seas limit.

Another contrasting aspect is that the definition regards the act of piracy as being
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carried out for “private ends”. In some incidents, the intentions of the pirates may not
be easy to differentiate between being for “private ends” and “public ends”. 2

According to Murphy (2007, p.159), the requirement that a pirate act had to be
committed for “private ends” had its origin in the distinction between piracy and
privateering. Actually, privateers were pirates under license by the States. During
piratical attacks, the privateers were not engaged in unwarranted brutality and lack of
witnesses. This is because they would have to justify the piratical attacks before a
Prize Court to establish a rightful claim to the stolen goods.

States authorized

privateering in as much as it is used against foreign and local ships perceived as
enemies, in which case it substitutes for the navy.

On the other hand, piracy was not under license and its acts were always against
States. The pirates attack their victims with outermost brutality and eliminate all
signs of witnesses as they did not owe any justification of their piracy acts to the
State. As a matter of fact, it was because of these reasons that the act of piracy was
described as being for “private ends”. This meant that the acts of piracy were for the
selfishness of the pirates, unlike in the acts of privateering, which was in the interest
of both the privateers and the States.

Furthermore, the intention of the pirates for financial gain in the acts of piracy is
difficult to be separated from socio-political gains.

In this regard, IMB defines,

broadly, piracy as an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any
other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.
This definition is wider and covers any illegal boarding of the ship both in harbour and
at sea, but it has no international legal standing. However, this paper will expand the
“private ends” requirement to mean “without authorization from any State”, in the act
of piracy.

2.4.

Armed Robbery

In order to expand the narrow definition of piracy as defined in the UNCLOS 1982,
the IMO has adopted the term “piracy and armed robbery against ships” in its nontreaty IMO documents. Accordingly, IMO defines armed robbery against ships as
“any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
2

To the victims of piratical attacks, the well organized groups of pirates are public enemies and their
intentions are for public ends and not for private ends.
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other than an act of ‘piracy’, directed against a ship or against persons or property
onboard such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences”. Also, in this
broad definition, armed robbery against ships can occur in both the territorial waters
and on the high seas. It is noteworthy that armed robbery is an act of violence and is,
therefore, categorized as another act of piracy.

Hence, in this paper the two

concepts will be used in combination with one another as piracy and armed robbery
against ships.
2.5.

Terrorism

Unlike piracy and other maritime crimes, maritime terrorism was a new phenomenon
to the shipping industry. Though the act of maritime terrorism is new, its occurrence
has not been uniformly reported globally. As Raymond (2005a, p.182) observed,
there was a high profile maritime terrorist attack which involved the hijacking of a
Greek freighter in Karachi in 1974. However, it was the hijacking of the cruise Liner
Achille Lauro by a terrorist group in 1985, off the coast of Egypt that attracted the
attention of the international community to this phenomenon of maritime terrorism.

According to Snoddon (2007, p.228), maritime terrorism can be defined as “any
unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to
coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or
ideological objectives”. Raymond (2005, p.181) defines maritime terrorism as any
illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea
ports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing, for political purposes, a
government or groups of individuals”. From these definitions, it can be clearly seen
that not only is piracy distinguishable from maritime terrorism but also the two
phenomena are linked together.

Maritime terrorism is differentiated from piracy;

while the former acts with the intent for political gains, the latter acts with the intent
for private gains. On the other hand, they are linked by the fact that a terrorist group
could employ the act of piracy for financial gain to support the acts of terror.
2.6.

Insurgency

Hansen (2009, p.77) defines insurgency as a protracted political-military activity
directed towards completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through
the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. As irregular
military forces, the insurgents engage in guerrilla combat against the regular armed
forces of a country. In this unconventional armed conflict, the insurgency groups
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could employ the use of piracy and terrorist attacks for the advancement of their
cause.

For the purpose of this paper, therefore, insurgency is defined as an

organized movement aimed at obtaining autonomy for certain geographical areas
from a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.
2.7.

Organized Crime

There are many criminal activities which are conducted in the marine environment.
Included in the organized crimes are smuggling, thefts, human and drug trafficking,
arms running and fraud among others.

Although the organized crimes are as

important as other unlawful acts in breach of maritime security, the analysis of the
impacts of organized crimes on the shipping industry as regards the ISPS Code will
be excluded in this paper. This is to provide enough time to analyze adequately the
impacts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, terrorism and insurgency on the
shipping industry, since these attacks usually inflict serious injury or death to persons
within the maritime domain.

2.8.

Maritime Zones

Earlier, the international community has attempted to draw lines that could define the
boundary limits of coastal States in the oceans of the world. The delimitation of
maritime zones has been disputed among nations as a result of probable
infringement on sovereignty, economy and off-shore resources control among others.
In order to resolve some of these issues, the UNCLOS 1982 has demarcated a
nation’s maritime domain into four zones. These zones are high seas, exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), contiguous zone and territorial waters which are shown in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1 - The Delimitation of Maritime Zones Worldwide
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2003). A description of Canada’s maritime zones.
Retrieved July 8, 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http:/www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/canadasoceans-oceansducanada/marinezoneszonesmarines-eng.htm

The territorial water is the zone consisting of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of
the coastal State. This zone is considered part of the territorial integrity of the coastal
State and therefore its national law supersedes any other international law. The
contiguous zone is defined as the zone extending from the edge of the territorial
water at a distance of 24 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this zone, the
coastal State has jurisdiction in enforcing its national law in the areas of pollution,
taxation, custom and immigration. Also, the EEZ is the zone extending beyond the
contiguous zone, at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline. In
this zone, the coastal State has the sole rights for the exploitation of the natural
resources such as fishing and oil exploration as well as production. Furthermore, the
high sea is defined as the zone measured seaward beyond the EEZ. This zone of
the sea is the international waters which are under universal jurisdiction.
2.9.

Legal Code

From history, the code is probably the earliest form of legislation. For example,
between 2200 and 1600 B.C., there was the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi. This
Code was a compilation of the Sumerian customs and practices in the TigrisEuphrates basin. 3

Mukherjee (2002, p.47) points out that a code is the vehicle

through which custom transforms into law. However, it was seen that this may not
always be the case, as with the Hindu Code or Law of Manu which dictated, rather,
3

Edgar Gold, in his treatise on ‘maritime transport’, observed that Tigris-Euphrates was the cradle of
western law and civilization.
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what the law should be.

Therefore, it is understood that codes could transform

customs and practices into law as well as prescribe what the law should be,
depending on the instances.

The code plays a vital role in civil law jurisdictions, similar to the role legislation plays
in the common law jurisdiction. According to Mukherjee (2002), the word “code” is
defined in common law jurisdiction as the legislation that confirms through legislation,
as the will and intent of the legislature, what was hitherto simply within the domain of
the common law. It was in this context that IMO codified SOLAS Chapter XI which
resulted to the ISPS Code the effectiveness of which this paper is to examine.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF SECURITY THREATS ON THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Admittedly, maritime security is one the most significant factors in the new world
order considering that the sea covers over 70 per cent of the earth surface. The
success of transportation by sea has made the nations of the world interdependent.
Easily, people, goods and services are moved by ships from one place to another
within a country and from one country to another globally, in what has resulted to be
known as world globalization. In the globalization of the world through the sea, the
safety of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for international trade need to be
sustained. This is because these SLOCs are vulnerable to threats from acts of
terrorism as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships among others.
3.1.

Terrorism

The new phenomenon on terrorism started in 1968 when a terrorist group, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an EIAL airliner en
route from Tel Aviv to Rome.

Since then, the number of terrorist groups has

increased and today there are some 36 terrorist groups dispersed across Europe,
Central and South America, the Middle East, Africa as well as the Sub-continent and
Southeast Asia (Herbert-Burns, 2005, p.157).

The list of various organizations

involved acts of terrorism and piracy is shown at the Table 1. These groups have
carried out extremely violent acts for alleged social, economic, political and religious
reasons among others. In 2000, the terrorist attack on USS Cole, in the port of
Yemen seemed to be socio-politically motivated. Prior to this attack, Bateman (2007,
p.242) stated that Al Qaeda had claimed that it would attack vital economic centres
and strategic enterprises of the “Jewish-Christian alliance”, including operations on
land, at sea and in the air.
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Table 1 - List of various Terrorist and Pirate Organizations
Geographical
Publicity
Serial Terrorist/Pirate
Location
Level
Organization
(a)

(c)

(b)

Tactics Employed/
Motivation

(d)

(e)

1.

Abu Sayyaf Group

Philippines

Low

Political/ Financial

2.

Al Qaeda

Worldwide

High

Political

3.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad

Egypt

Medium

Political

4.

Euskadi ta Askatasuna

Spain/France

Medium

Political

5.

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka

Indonesia

Medium

Political/ Financial

6.

Hamas

Palestine

Medium

Political

7.

Jemaah Islamiyah

Southeast Asia

High

Political

8.

LTTE

Sri Lakan

Medium

Political/ Financial

9.

MEND

Nigeria

Medium

Political/ Financial

10.

PFLP

Palestine

High

Political

11.

Revolutionary

Medium

Political/ Financial

None

Financial

Armed Colombia

Force of Colombia
12.

Somali Marines

Somalia

Source: Hansen, H.T. (2009). Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles
Model” for Maritime Threat Assessment. Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security,
Auerbach Publications.

Whitaker (2002, October) opined that the terrorist attack on the Merchant Tanker (MT)
Limburg in Yemen waters was economically motivated.

This was implied by Al

Qaeda’s stated intention to attack Western oil interests:

… By exploding the oil tanker in Yemen, the holy warriors hit the umbilical
cord and lifeline of the crusader community, reminding the enemy of the
heavy cost of blood and gravity of losses they will pay as a price for their
continued aggression on our community and looting of our wealth. 4

In both attacks, Al Qaeda has used small and fast dinghy boats as vectors to carry
Tri-Nitro-Toluene (TNT) explosives estimated to be 100-200 kg. These boats were
rammed into the target ships causing massive explosions and damage to the ships
structure as well as death of some crew members. These incidents underscore the
international community concern that terrorist groups could employ the use of ships
as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to carry out attacks on coastal states.
4

Statement purportedly from Osama bin Ladan and his cohorts congratulating “the Islamic
Community” on the attack on tanker Limburg.
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The attack on the USS Cole was intended to kill human beings onboard the vessel.
It resulted in the death of 19 crew members while 37 others were injured and the ship
damaged severely. In the case of MT Limburg, the attack was conducted to inflict
huge financial loss to the country as a result of the oil spill of about 90,000 gross tons,
although a member of the crew was also killed. It could be concluded therefore that
the impact of terrorists attacks result not only in loss of life, economic and damage to
the social system, but also to the degradation of the maritime environment.

Acts of maritime terrorism have continued to occur in the regions of the world,
especially in the South East Asia and the Indian Sub-continent. Examples of such
acts are the sinking of Super ferry 14 in the Philippines and the several attacks on
merchant ships and Sri Lakan Navy ships by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam
(LTTE).

However, events have shown that maritime targets would not be the

preferred choice for acts of terrorism. Terrorists would prefer targets on land where
success is most likely such as in the attacks on mass urban transport in London and
Madrid as well as in Mumbai, which has recently included attacks on hotels and
hospitals.

3.2.

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships

Banlaoi (2005, p.61) asserted in his study that acts of piracy occur in ports,
anchorages and at high seas. Also, he opined that pirates range from opportunistic
fishermen and common criminals to members of sophisticated Asian crime
syndicates. In these situations, the acts of piracy range from the classic boarding
and hijacking of a merchant vessel on the high seas to the more common act of
stealing from the ship while it is anchored. From this study, four types of piracy acts
were identified. They are piratical attacks on vessels at anchorage, attacks against
vessels at territorial waters, hijacking of commercial vessels on high seas and
kidnapping of crew for ransom.

According to IMB Reports for the past 15 years, an extract of which is at Appendix A,
there has been drastic increase in the number of piracy and armed robbery against
ships globally, since 1994. Appendix B shows the trend analysis of the statistical
data, within the period from 1994 to 2008. From the statistics, the highest number of
piratical attacks recorded was 469 and it occurred in 2000 prior to the 9/11. Having
dropped to 335 in 2001, the number peaked again to 445 in 2003 in the aftermath
of 9/11 and subsequent entering into of stricter ISPS Code; although the Code has
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been a security measure primarily for counter-terrorism, it can also counter acts of
piracy and other maritime crimes. Therefore, the initial drop was temporary; resulting
more from the global sympathetic mood during the period of 9/11 than the
effectiveness of existing and new maritime security regimes.

The number of the incidents has skyrocketed in some geographical areas such as
the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia; in other areas such as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore they have decreased significantly. During this period, the
Report also indicated an increasing number of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea
and off the coast of Nigeria in particular. One of the factors that contributed to the
reduction of the acts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca is the introduction regional
cooperation in ensuring maritime security in the region spearheaded by Japan. The
Japan’s ReCAAP Initiative has improved the maritime security in Southeast Asia
tremendously. Another regional agreement, the MALSINDO, which is a joint naval
patrolling cooperation between the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,
has also contributed to the reduction of piratical attacks in the Straits of Malacca.
Globally, within the last 2 years, the number of attacks increased from 263, in 2007
to 293, in 2008 which represents about 11 per cent increase.

Lowry (2009) believes that the cost of piracy acts has increased globally as ransoms
paid increased from an average of USD 1.2 million in 2007 to USD 1.7 million in 2008.
This is attributable to the recent increase in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. In
a statement by Kemp 5 , it seems the duration of ordeals from piracy acts have
doubled from an average of 40 days in 2007 to 80 days in 2008. Obviously, the
increase in the ransoms paid to pirates has resulted in prolonging the ordeals of their
victims. Pirates could care less for the ordeals of their victims during negotiations as
long as the ransoms paid are high. Therefore, the increase in the number of piratical
attacks has not only placed a huge financial burden on the world’s economy but also
prolonged the ordeals of victims.
3.3.

The Link between Piracy and Terrorism

Though the acts of piracy and terrorism are distinct from one another, there is a link
between them. Recent developments and incidents around the world suggest that
this link has been shortened tremendously. As a result, some experts and policy

5

Alex Kemp is operations manager for NYA International, a specialist subsidiary of Group 4 Security,
G4S.
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makers are unsure at what point piracy becomes terrorism. Banlaoi (2005, p.68)
states that the Singapore Home Minister asserted that in a crime conducted at sea, it
is difficult to determine whether it is pirates or terrorists who occupy the ship. 6
Therefore he is of the opinion that the two acts will be treated alike.

According to Hansen (2009, p.77), an organization could employ a number of tactics
such as piracy and terrorism acts as distinct ways of achieving their overall strategic
objectives.

For example, an insurgency organization engages in a guerrilla

campaign against the military force of a country. At the same time, it is mounting
terrorist attacks on public targets as well as conducting a range of illegal activities to
finance the operations. The terrorist group, Abu Sayyal Group (ASG), based in the
Southern Philippines, has followed this type of pattern in its operations in Southeast
Asia. It has been linked to hijacking and kidnapping for ransom, including raids from
the sea on holiday resorts. 7 Furthermore, the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF) in Nigeria
employ similar tactics of piracy as well as terrorism to achieve its goals.

There are some terrorist groups which have maintained particular tactics of terrorism.
These groups include Al Qaeda and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). Although Al
Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole was a pure act of terrorism, nevertheless, the
terrorist group employed the tactics of pirates in using a small boat for transportation
towards its target ships. However, in this case, the Al Qaeda not only used the boat
for transportation, but also as a weapon that rammed itself into the USS Cole in the
Port of Yemen. The link in this case is that some terrorists groups could employ the
tactics of piracy to carry out acts of terrorism as well as to raise funds for their illegal
groups. Therefore, there is a link between piracy and terrorism as long as the pirates
collude with terrorists while in some cases terrorists adopt the tactics of pirates in
their operations.
3.4.

Weapons at Sea

The acts of piracy and maritime terrorism are closely related activities involving
armed violence at sea.

Earlier, pirates used weapons less dangerous such as

dagger, long knives, machetes, axes, crowbars, clubs and swords. Today, however,

6

In December 2003, the Singapore Home Minister granted an interview to the Agence France Presse
where he discussed the theme, “Piracy equals Terrorism in Troubled Waters”.
7
ASG was accused of the abduction of six workers in Borneo on 7 October 2003.

17

they use more sophisticated and lethal weapons varying from pistol to rocket
propelled grenade launcher (RPG) as shown at Table 2.

Table 2 - Weapons Used in Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Name of
Serial Weapon
Weapon Specifications
(a)
(b)
(c)
1.
Pistol
Calibre – 9mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 375 m/s; Magazine
capacity – 10 to 15 rounds.
2.
SMGs
Calibre – 9 mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 400 m/s; Cyclic
rate – approx 800 rpm; Magazine capacity – 20 to 30
rounds.
AK-47 Assault Calibre – 7.62 mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 700 m/s;
3.
Rifle (Russian)
Cyclic rate – approx 600 rpm; Magazine capacity – 30
rounds. Effective range – max 400 m.
AK-47 Assault Calibre – 5.45 mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 900 m/s;
4.
Rifle (Russian)
Cyclic rate – approx 600/650 rpm; Magazine capacity – 30
rounds. Effective range – max 500 m.
56-1
Assault Calibre – 7.62 mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 710 m/s;
5.
Rifle (Chinese)
Cyclic rate – approx 600 rpm; Magazine capacity – 30
rounds. Effective range – max 400 m.
M-16 A1/A2/A3 Calibre – 5.56 mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 945 m/s;
6.
Assault Rifle
Cyclic rate – approx 650/750 rpm; Magazine capacity – 20
to 30 rounds. Effective range – max 460/550 m.
(USA)
Warhead – Fin stabilized 40 mm armour piercing, anti
7.
RPG -7
armour, high explosives and anti personnel grenade;
Launcher
Effective range – max 300/920 m (single mobile/area target)
Source:
Herbert-Burns, R. (2007). In P. Lehr (Ed.), Violence at Sea (p.111).
Routledge Publication, New York.
Burnet (2002) reveals that officers from the Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP)
have encountered pirates in the shipping lanes in the Malacca Straits having same
tactical competence and weapons similar to the ones used by members of the
Indonesian Navy.

This was based on the fact that some M-16 assault rifles

recovered were in common use by the Indonesian Navy. However is this case, the
fact remains that these weapons are readily available anywhere in the world and can
be purchased accordingly. Also, the weapons have been proliferated to the extent
that organized criminals could acquire them from the black market with relative ease.
Furthermore, the use of assault rifles, sub-machine guns (SMG), rocket-propelled
grenade launchers (RPGs) and water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs)
has made acts of pirates to be indistinguishable from those of terrorism.

This

sophistication in use of weapons contrasted the earlier ones, when pirates used
weapons less dangerous such as dagger and crowbars among others.
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In addition to mastery of weapons, the pirates and terrorists are also skilful and
experienced in ship handling. This is an indication that the perpetrators of these
crimes could also belong to families of fishermen from where they have gained the
sea experience. For example, it has been stated that the LTTE attacks on merchant
vessels and Sri Lakan warships were possible because many Tamil Tigers were
formally fishermen. Consequent upon these facts, the acts of terrorism and piracy
have become sophisticated globally. Therefore, there is need for the proliferation of
these weapons to be checked and controlled at sea to ensure maritime security.

3.5.

Threats to Ships

According to Chalk (2009, p.118), security threats to ships affects approximately
112,000 merchant vessels which are parts of the contemporary international maritime
transport system.

In this system, these ships are the link to about 225 coastal

nations, dependent territories and island states, while the transport system wideranging network caters for about 80 per cent of commercial freight. Among the ships
vulnerable to pirates’ and terrorists’ attacks in the transport system are container
ships, cruise liners and passenger ferries. However, ships using the international
maritime transport system would be incomplete without including naval ships. It is
therefore important that warships are included in the network of international
maritime transport system susceptible to attack.

Bateman (2007, p.243) stated that the sinking of Super ferry 14 in February 2004,
near Manila in the Philippines, which resulted in the death of 116 people, has been
the most serious act of maritime terrorism.

This attack was carried out by the

terrorist group, ASG. Undoubtedly, pirates and terrorists target both merchant ships
and warships among which are the MT Limburg and USS Cole. In the case of MT
Limburg, one crew member was killed while that of USS Cole resulted in the death of
nineteen crew members. It is noteworthy that the number of human lives lost in the
incident of Super ferry 14 is far greater than the number lost in the combined
incidents of USS Cole and MT Limburg. Globally, however, the incidents of USS
Cole and MT Limburg have attracted more attention than that of Super ferry 14. This
is because both were initiated by Al Qaeda and occurred in the context of 9/11.

In addition, the likelihood of attacks on a passenger ferry is higher than on a cruise
liner, tanker and warship.

This is because of the large number of people who

would employ the services of ferries which are cheap and highly accessible.
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Chalk (2007, p.123) insists that the mode of transport by ferry is quite reliable and is
also a cost-effective alternative to flying. This has made many people use it as a
principal means of transportation both internationally and nationally. Additionally, in
some designs, the roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) ships could carry cars, tourist coaches, buses,
minivans and freight trucks. Chalk (2009. p.124) stresses that the high number of
passengers and large volume of embarking traffic would make it practically difficult to
take extant security measures at the terminals without the impact of disruption, unlike
the situation of cruise liners. Nevertheless, as with cruise liners, terrorist attacks on
ferries could result in mass casualties which are likely to have acute political
ramifications. Furthermore, it could elicit strong domestic pressure for the initiation of
mitigation measures extending far beyond the maritime realm. Therefore, it would
impact on the economy as the ship-owners would be exposed to large-scale
compensation. This is seen from the point of view of the liability paid when major
ferry accidents have occurred, which although were not due to acts of piracy and
terrorism. For example, the 1994 sinking of Estonia in the Baltic Sea resulted in 852
deaths and attracted victims’ claims of about USD 110 million.

Also, the 1987

capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise which resulted in 193 deaths attracted
claims of about USD 70 million. Undoubtedly, the liability payments would most likely
have been much higher had terrorism figured as the cause of these incidents.
3.6.

Threats to Ports

From the IMB Report, there is increase in the threats from acts of piracy and
terrorism on about 6,500 ports and harbour facilities, as well as 45,000 shipping
bureaus in the global maritime transport system. Bateman (2007, p.248) observed
that ports by their nature are vulnerable to criminal attacks. Ports vary greatly with
regards to their physical features such as geography, topography, surroundings and
population. Some ports are isolated and remotely located while others are located at
the centre of a crowded city. Also, separate facilities may not be large in a given port
area while the geographical extent of a port may be very wide. Therefore, to ensure
port security involves ensuring the security of maritime environments which comprise
of land, air, sea surface and subsurface. Definitely, it would be difficult to achieve
maritime security in all the environments and this would make the ports susceptible
to piratical and terrorist attacks.

In the busy areas of ports with access by land and sea, it could be practically
impossible to secure the waterside physically. This is in contrast to airports which
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have well defined perimeters and usually some form of buffer zone between the
airport and other activities. As a result, access to an airport is more easily controlled
than to a seaport. In this regards, Banlaoi (2005, p.66) opined that terrorist groups
regard seaports and commercial ships, in particular cruise liners as very attractive
targets. Similarly, experts have assessed that a more sinister scenario is the threat
that a small but lethal biological weapon could be smuggled into a harbour onboard a
ship and released into a crowded port. Therefore, the incident of the terrorist attack
on USS Cole at Aden Port in Yemen seems to suggest to an initial planning stage by
the Al Qaeda in the exploitation of the vulnerability of ports to carry out acts of
terrorism.

Recently, the world-wide increase in acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,
which is spearheaded by the unprecedented surge in piratical attacks in the Gulf of
Aden off the coast of Somalia, has attracted the attention of the international
community. This is because the acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships
seem to flourish despite the presence of international legal regimes to combat the
crimes. Subsequently, this paper will explore the international legislative framework
designed to ensure maritime security.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES ON ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY

Over the years, the international legal regime has been developed and modified to
adapt to prevailing unlawful acts which threaten maritime safety and security.
According to Mukherjee (2002, p.55) the legal regimes set out the general principles
and framework of the law which often represent a codification of prevalent
international custom and practice. This is in response to evolving threats to maritime
security that the international community undertakes to amend existing legislation
and where necessary enact new conventions. Included in these public international
law conventions are LOSC 1982, SUA 1988 Protocol and SOLAS 1974 As Amended.
This cahpter will look at the rationale of the conventions in combating piracy, armed
robbery against ships and terrorism.

4.1.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982

In the past, piracy and armed robbery against ships were the major threats to the
security of commercial shipping; the pirates attacking and forcefully gaining control of
ships to rob the crew of their valuables and cargo. Accordingly, coastal States took
certain measures to protect ships and their crews from piratical attacks by persons
operating from other ship. Over time, these measures transformed into customs
which were used to formulate customary international law. The traditional law of
piracy was codified in the 1958 first United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS I) and the subsequent Conferences. 8 The Conferences on the Law of
the Sea resulted in the adoption of UNCLOS 1982 by the international community.

According to UNCLOS (1982), acts of piracy are universal crimes and therefore
punishable under the law of a State. However, the UNCLOS defined the act of piracy
in a narrow sense which makes it difficult for member States to have a common
concept of the piracy act. For example, one of the elements of piracy acts is that
8

It is contained in Articles 15 and 22 of the Convention on High Seas (UNCLOS I). Subsequent
Conferences are UNCLOS II in 1960 and UNCLOS III between 1973 and 1982.
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they should be committed at high seas.
jurisdiction on these high seas.

There is no particular State that has

However, the provision of “high seas” in the

UNCLOS definition of piracy is hardly fulfilled in the new phenomenon of piracy
whereby such acts occur mostly within the territorial waters of the coastal States.
Banlaoi (2005, p.61) observed that piratical attacks occur mostly in ports and
anchorages globally. Also, a large number of piracy incidents occur in straits, choke
points and archipelagic waters. Among these are the Malacca and Singapore Straits
and the surrounding waters of Malaysia and Indonesia archipelagic waters. By the
existing definition, these violent attacks are clearly not acts of piracy, since they
occur within the territorial waters of the coastal States. Therefore, the UNCLOS
definition of piracy as an illegal act occurring on the high seas would need to be
conceptualized to include incidents of armed robbery against ships and maritime
terrorism within the territorial waters.

Another difficulty encountered with UNCLOS is in the implementation of the “two
ships” requirement in the act of piracy by member States. In addition to the piracy
acts being carried out on high seas, the pirates are required to board the target ship
from another ship or aircraft. However, there have been some incidents whereby the
crew or passengers attack the ship illegally from within, such as the case of
passenger ships Achille Lauro and Santa Maria. 9 In January 1961, a Portuguese
passenger liner Santa Maria was hijacked by a team of insurgents, led by Enrique
Galvao, who disguised as passengers onboard the ship.

According to Menefee

(1990, p.57), the Portuguese Authority reaction was to brand the Santa Maria’s
insurgents as “pirates”, while requesting the assistance of recognised friendly
governments of countries such as the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) among
others in recovering the vessel. Though the USA and the UK agreed to assist, there
was no doubt that they had reservations on the labelling of the incident as an act of
piracy. This is evident from the instruction to the British Senior Naval Officer in the
West Indies whereby he was instructed to arrest the Santa Maria without the use of
force, through peaceful means.

In the case of Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise liner, four armed Palestinians belonging
to the PFLP boarded as passengers. The ship with 400 passengers and crew was
hijacked off the coast of Egypt and the hijackers demanded the release of 50
9

On 23 January, 1961, a party led by Captain Galvao seized the Santa Maria, while it was cruising in
the Caribbean. Galvao and his companions, who embarked as ordinary passengers, seized the ship in
order to call the attention of world opinion to the dictatorship then ruling Portugal.
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Palestinians prisoners held in Israel.

In demonstration of their seriousness, the

hijackers killed one of the American tourists onboard and threw his body together
with his wheel chair overboard. Again there is division among some countries on how
to handle this phenomenon of violent and criminal acts onboard ships which is not
covered by the provisions of UNCLOS.

The USA whose citizen was murdered,

considered the incident as a piratical attack in which case the perpetrators should be
brought to justice.

Egypt, as the port State, maintained that it was an act of

insurgency and that insurgents could be negotiated with to resolve the issue
peacefully. Italy, whose flag the liner Achille Lauro was flying, was undecided on
how to characterise the incident as a piratical attack. After long tortuous negotiations,
a settlement was reached by which the remaining hostages were freed and the
hijackers allowed to flee.

Obviously, these incidents against commercial shipping present more serious threats
to global maritime security than the ones posed by the traditional pirates. Unlike the
provisions in UNCLOS, the attackers operated on the same ship where they were
passengers and did not board the ship from another ship. Also they acted without
concern for their private gains, as they were seeking political and religious gains
among others as well as calling the attention of the international community to
address their grievances. It is arguable that the existing legal regime is sufficient to
tackle this evolving security threat since for the victims, the intentions of the attackers
are irrelevant. However, the events on the Santa Maria and Achille Lauro have
shown that the traditional law of piracy could not effectively address the issues of
maritime security in the present time. In response to the incident onboard the Achille
Lauro, the international community noted, with great concern, the danger to
passengers and cargoes resulting from the increasing number of incidents involving
piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or onboard ships, including
small craft at anchor and underway. Therefore in one of its resolutions, the IMO
called for measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and
the security of their passengers and crew.

4.2.

SUA Convention 1988 As Amended

The international community has resolved that a new legal instrument, the SUA
Convention 1988 and Protocol 2005, would be needed to supplement the existing
regimes in dealing with the current trends on unlawful acts against commercial
shipping. While the SUA Convention 1988 was adopted on 10 March 1988 and
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entered into force on 1 March 1992, the SUA Protocol 2005 was adopted on 14
October 2005, with the provision that it would enter into force 90 days after the date
on which 12 States formally ratify or accept it. This is to be done through an official
notification to the IMO secretary general of the States’ consent, to be bound by the
Protocol’s provisions. According to IMO Report (2009b) only 8 States have ratified
the SUA Convention 2005 amendments as of 31 July 2009.

In drafting the SUA Convention 1988, the models existing in the aviation industry
were used. Among these models were the Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 1970 and the Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention), 1971. It is worth noting that the Hague Convention 1970 and Montreal
Convention 1971 were the first UN terrorism conventions. The SUA Convention
states that it is an offence for any person to seize and exercise control over a ship by
force, threat of force and any other form of intimidation.

Mensah (2004, p.2)

observed that this position of the Convention is suggested in its preamble where it
states to provide effective and practical measures for the prevention of all unlawful
acts against the safety of maritime navigation as well as the prosecution and
punishment of the perpetrators.

According to Beckman (2009, p.189), the scheme of the SUA Convention 1988 has
five features. Among these are the definitions of some specific criminal offenses for
states parties to criminalize under their domestic law punishable by serious
penalties 10 and establishment of jurisdiction over these criminal offenses within their
territory 11 . Others are the obligation to “extradite or prosecute” 12 offenders who are in
custody of another state party accordingly 13 and the Convention substituting as the
legal basis for states parties to extradite alleged offenders to another state regardless
of any existing extradition treaty. 14 Also, it includes the obligations of states parties
to afford one another the greatest measures of cooperation in connection with
criminal proceedings to prosecute the offenders. 15

10

Article 3 of the SUA Convention 1988 has the list of all the offenses
Article 6 of the SUA Convention 1988.
12
Article 7 of the SUA Convention 1988.
13
Article 10 of the SUA Convention 1988.
14
Article 11 of the SUA Convention 1988.
15
Article 12 of the SUA Convention 1988.
11
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Clearly, the SUA Convention was the real first attempt to broaden the provisions of
piracy acts in the UNCLOS to include armed robbery against ships and acts of
terrorism among others.
Convention.

But some member States were slow in rectifying the

According to Beckman (2009, p.190), only 52 member States had

ratified the Convention as at 31 December 2000. However, after the event of 9/11 at
the World Trade Centre, the USA changed this slow attitude and subsequently the
number of member States who ratified the Convention increased to 142, which is
significant. Since being enforced, the Convention has been a very useful instrument
in combating unlawful acts in commercial shipping. It should be emphasized here
that the usefulness of this Convention was not utilized in the incident of merchant
vessel Petro Range in April 1999.

The Petro Range was owned by a Singapore national, flying the flag of Malaysia and
hijacked by Indonesians off the coast of Malaysia. The hijacked ship was used for
smuggling in China where the Indonesian “pirates” were arrested and charged
accordingly. They were convicted and served only a few months in jail as specified
for the smuggling offenses. Though China is a party to the Convention, Indonesia
and Malaysia were not party States at time of the hijacking. As a result, the two
States could not demand from China the obligation to extradite or prosecute the
alleged offenders in their custody as provided in the Convention. However, in the
case of the MV Alondra Rainbow, the ship was owned by a Japanese and was flying
the flag of Panama. The IMB reported the ship, having being hijacked in the Malacca
Strait off the coast of Indonesia. The Indian Navy interdicted and boarded the ship in
the Indian Ocean within its EEZ to arrest the pirates.

This was purely on the

provisions of the Convention, since there was no provision for this type of arrest in
Indian domestic maritime law which was an offshoot from their colonial past.

The SUA Convention 1988 gives enforcement power to coastal states to the extent
that an offense under the Convention also constitutes a piracy act as defined in
Article 101 of the UNCLOS, whereby any state could arrest and seize the pirates on
the high seas, EEZ and territorial waters. However, the SUA Convention (1988)
dealt only with acts that threaten safety of maritime navigation.

Also, in the

Convention’s definitions of criminal offenses, it falls short of terrorism, despite the fact
that it was modelled along the lines of other terrorism conventions. Furthermore, the
Convention did not make additional provision for states to interdict, board ships and
arrest offenders.

Therefore the effectiveness of this Convention in combating

maritime crimes is limited.
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The SUA Protocol 2005 is an improvement on the SUA Convention 1988 which was
revised. The provisions in the SUA Protocol are far reaching and three categories of
new offenses were added to the list, while defining acts of terrorism in its annex
containing the UN terrorism conventions, as follows:
•

The first category of new offenses concerns acts of maritime terrorism such as
using a ship as a vector and means to carry out terrorist attacks.

•

The second category deals with non-proliferation offenses that are intended to
strengthen the international legal basis to impede and prosecute the trafficking
in commercial ships of WMD on the high seas.

•

Further, the third category establishes a new tool for dealing with persons who
commit offenses under the other UN terrorism conventions.

Undoubtedly, the provision for acts of terrorism in the SUA Protocol 2005 could
sufficiently address the issue of the menace of terrorism in commercial shipping.
However, the member States were reluctant to rectify the Protocol.

There are

provisions in the SUA Protocol 2005 that member States and some international
shipping organizations would need to agree on.

The new offenses listed in the

Protocol require a specific “knowledge and intent” as well as “terrorist motive”, which
must be to intimidate a population and compel a government to do or not doing an
act.

The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO, 2004) is among the

international organizations that submitted comments on the draft SUA Protocol which
led to modifications.

Following these comments, it was suggested that the provisions of knowledge and
intent in the final draft of the new offenses be incorporated to protect the interest of
innocent seafarers and carriers.

Among other provisions provoking debate by

member States are issues of proliferation in the scope of nuclear material offense,
“dual-use” items in the transport offense. The “saving clause” in the new offenses for
States party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was rejected by India and Pakistan
among others. Furthermore, though there was provision for interdiction and boarding
of suspected ships in the SUA Protocol 2005, the “tacit authorization” provision for
the boarding of ships at high seas was rejected by member States. In this way, the
Protocol retains the provision in the UNCLOS for the boarding of ships on the high
seas, which is solely on the authority of the flag States. However, recent events in
Somalia are indication that the authority of a flag State does not exist where there is
no

functional

Government.

Nevertheless,
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the effectiveness

of

the SUA

Convention 1988 and Protocol 2005 would depend upon all the member States
becoming parties to it.

4.3.

SOLAS Convention 1974 As Amended

From the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the USA, in addition with the attacks on
USS Cole and MT Limburg, some amendments in the provisions SOLAS Convention
became necessary.

These amendments are for the effective detection and

deterrence of acts of terrorism to enhance maritime security. There is no doubt that
the existing legal regimes such as UNCLOS, SUA Convention and Protocol among
others could not adequately combat the menace of terrorism. The use of the modes
of transport by air, land and sea to conduct terrorists attacks have evolved globally.
For example, the hijacked aircraft used for the 9/11 attacks fulfilled the safety
conditions as prescribed in the existing international conventions and were actually
safe to fly. However, it has been demonstrated that there is a distinction between
safety and security. Therefore, the issue of acts of terrorism among other maritime
crimes could not be effectively addressed with safety but rather through security
measures. Hence, the international community agreed that a new regulatory regime
would be needed for combating this trend of acts of terrorism on commercial shipping.

At its diplomatic conference in December 2002, the IMO adopted SOLAS 1974 As
Amended to enhance the maritime security measures for ships and port facilities.
The Convention as amended entered into force on 1 July 2004. The amendments to
the SOLAS 1974 consist essentially of the changes in the existing Chapters XI, which
resulted to Chapter XI-1 and the addition of a new Chapter XI-2. The renamed
Chapter XI-1 deals with special measures to enhance maritime safety while Chapter
XI-2 deals with special measures to enhance maritime security which in principle
incorporates new regulations on definitions and the requirements for ships and port
facilities. These regulations are supported by the ISPS Code which has a mandatory
section Part A and a recommendatory section Part B.

The overall objective of the ISPS Code was to establish a form of international
framework involving cooperation between all stakeholders in the maritime industry to
detect and deter acts of terrorism which threaten maritime security.

The

stakeholders include the Governments of member States, agencies, ship owners,
shipping companies and port authorities among others. However, like in the other
existing conventions, member States could not agree to some proposals for
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improving the security of ships in the new Code.

For example, some States

expressed concerns about the proposals for the development of requirements on
seafarer identification and background checks. This was considered to be an issue
that was more appropriate for the International Labour Organization (ILO) to handle.

Another concern in the proposals was the extent to which the new Code could be
applied to ports. The reason was that the SOLAS Convention 1974 As Amended,
which is a regulatory regime for the Code, had hitherto been applicable to ships only.
Extending the Convention to regulate issues within ports might not go down well with
some member States. To deal with these concerns, it was decided, therefore, that
the term “port facilities”, should be used in the final draft to relate solely to the
ship/port interface.

According to Mensah (2004, p.7), although the ISPS Code was

adopted within what is referred to as the “technical” aspects of the work of IMO, it
plays a major role in the overall international regulatory regime for promoting and
enhancing maritime security. However, effective implementation of this Code in
conjunction with other international, regional and national regulations is pivotal for the
prevention of all types of unlawful acts, including those directed against ships as well
as those that would seek to use ships and persons among others.
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CHAPTER 5

MARITIME SECURITY INSTRUMENTS

This chapter evaluates the legal instruments used in ensuring maritime security
globally since the incident of 9/11. The instruments will include the ISPS Code 2002,
USA maritime initiatives, Comité Maritime International (CMI) model national law and
maritime security operations.

5.1.

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

The ISPS Code 2002 was formulated for international shipping by the IMO as a
comprehensive regime to strengthen maritime security and specifically to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism against the maritime realm. A number of measures
were adopted in July 2004 in the SOLAS Convention 1974 As Amended, which
aimed at enhancing maritime security onboard ships and at the ship-port interface.
These amendments created a new SOLAS Chapter XI-2, which contains special
measures to enhance maritime security. Specifically, it deals with maritime security
containing the mandatory requirement for member States’ ships and port facilities to
comply with the ISPS Code. The Code came into force on 1 July 2004.

Fundamentally, the ISPS Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships
and port facilities is basically a risk management activity. Also, it demands that to
determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must
be made in each particular case.

The purpose of the Code is to provide a

standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to
offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability, for ships and port facilities.

Furthermore, in its preamble the ISPS Code states that the increase in maritime
threats would only be counteracted logically with a reduction in vulnerability.
Obviously, this seems to be the case in order to minimise the security risk level which
is a combination of the threat and vulnerability associated with it. The Code provides
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several ways in which vulnerability could be reduced. One of the ways is that the
ship will be subjected to a system of survey, verification and control to ensure that
the security measures are implemented.

This system of survey is based on a

considerably expanded control system as stipulated in the SOLAS 1974 Convention
As Amended.

The SOLAS XI and the ISPS Code prescribe the measures to be taken in addressing
the issues of maritime security in the light of the 9/11 incident. These measures
could be broadly divided into five major categories according to their focus. They are
measures targeting contracting governments, ships, shipping companies’ certification
and ports.

5.1.1. Measures Targeting Contracting Government

To begin the process of security measures, each Contracting Government will
conduct Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSAs) in its area of responsibility.
These assessments have three essential components which include the identification
and evaluation of important assets and infrastructures that are critical to the port
facility as well as those areas or structures that, if damaged could cause significant
loss of life and among others. Also, the security assessment must identify the actual
threats to focus on critical assets and infrastructures in order to prioritize security
measures. Furthermore, the assessment must address the vulnerability of the port
facility by identifying its weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity,
protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems, transportation
infrastructure, utilities and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely target.
These security assessments are essential for the Contracting Governments to
accurately evaluate risk.

The principal responsibilities of Contracting Governments under the IMO security
regulations are to enforce the relevant provisions in SOLAS and the ISPS Code and
make rules accordingly. It is also the responsibility of the Contracting Government to
designate an Authority for the implementation of the ISPS Code to determine and set
the appropriate security levels 1, 2 and 3 which correspond to normal, heightened
and exceptional threat situations respectively.
Governments are as follows:
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Other responsibilities of the

•

Determination of which port facilities are required to designate a Port Facility
Security Officer (PFSO).

•

Ensuring completion and approval of a PFSA and the Port Facility Security
Plan (PFSP) for each port facility that serves ships engaged on international
voyages.

•

Approving the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and amendments to previously
approved plans.

•

Verifying the compliance of ships and issuing the International Ship Security
Certificate (ISSC) and any subsequent amendments.

•

Exercising control and compliance measures in capacity as Port State.

•

Communicating information to the IMO, shipping companies and port industries.

Considering the “Security Level 1 Normal”, it gives the minimum appropriate
protective security measures which shall be maintained at all times onboard ships
and port facilities.

These minimum measures shall ensure that all ship security

duties are performed; access as well as the embarkation of persons and their effects
controlled among others. At “Security Level 2 Heighten”, the additional protective
measures as specified in the SSP shall be implemented. Also, at “Security Level 3
Exceptional”, the further specific protective measures in the SSP shall be maintained.
Practically, the implementation of these provisions in the Code is rarely carried out.
Jones (2009, p.104) observed that some member States seem to be taking a relaxed
view even in the wake of terrorist attacks. The reason being deduced is that the
higher security level would result in an increase in the provision of resources and
change in the operating conditions onboard the ship. However, this would raise one
of the major issues of the security management system’s inability to increase security
when a rise of level is imposed, thereby weakening the global security regime.

5.1.2. Measures Targeting Ships

Some ship-related provisions were modified in the SOLAS Convention 1974
Chapter XI.

These include the acceleration of the implementation of the

requirements to fit Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), marking of Ship’s
Identification Number, installation of Ship’s Security Alert System and the
carriage of a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) among others.

According to

Murphy (2009, p.14), AIS could enhance maritime safety by providing all ship and
shore stations with details of the position, course and speed of all the other AIS-
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equipped vessels within range. In addition, it would facilitate more rapid and precise
communication between stations in cases of emergency. However, the AIS is an
insecure means of communication, since the signal is broadcast and open to any
appropriate receiver.

Furthermore, the low cost of AIS equipment and its wide

availability constitutes a risk as pirates and terrorists could easily acquire the
equipment for their nefarious use. Additionally, the recent incident of piratical attack
on Malta-flagged Russian cargo ship Artic Sea in the Baltic Sea in July 2009 has
shown that pirates, once onboard, can render the AIS ineffective by switching off the
responders.

5.1.3. Measures Targeting Shipping Companies

The IMO rules outlined some steps required for the issuance of a ISSC. Therefore, it
is the principal responsibility for ship-owners and shipping companies to ensure that
their ships obtain ISSC. The ISSC is to be issued by the Administration or by a
Recognized Security Organization (RSO), such as a classification society, on behalf
of the Flag State. These are designating a Company Security Officer (CSO), Ship
Security Officer (SSO), undertaking a Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and
developing a Flag-State approved SSP which incorporates all of the elements
included in part “A” of the ISPS Code. Also, it includes providing adequate training
for the CSO, SSO and the Crew, ensuring adequate drills and exercises are carried
out, proper equipment of the ships for security matters as outlined in the SSP and
adequate keeping of security-related records outlined in part “A” of the ISPS Code.

It is noteworthy that the SSP could be one of the best allies of ships and their crew.
However, it could be a snare for the shipping company, far more damaging than the
act of piracy and terrorism. It has been said that the key to maritime security is
making the SSP work through the development of a security system that is capable
of working.

Jones (2009, p.96) states that there are some SSPs which are

unfortunately not fit for the purpose of ensuring security. Therefore, there is a need
for the CSO, SSO, master and Flag State to work together in ensuring that the ship
would comply and realistically respond to any eventuality of criminal attacks.
However, the Port State having clear grounds to believe that the ship is not in
compliance with the requirements of the ISPS Code can review the relevant
requirements of the SSP with the consent of the master or Flag State. It is well
understood that security threats are based on maritime domain intelligence, which is
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changing continuously. The implication of this is that the SSP would need to be a
living document which is maintained and updated regularly.

5.1.4. Measures Targeting Ports

The ISPS Code sets out broadly analogous requirements for ports as it does for
ships. Port facilities that are involved in international shipping are required to carry
out an approved PFSA, develop PFSP and designate a PFSO with skills and training
similar to the CSO. Other requirements for the port facilities are to ensure that the
PFSO and other personnel receive adequate training and that the port facilities are
sufficiently equipped as well as manned to operate under the three levels of security
alert.

It is observed that the Code deals with issues concerning port facilities and not ports.
A port facility is conceptualized as the ship-port interface, which is the point of
interaction between the ship and the port. It is at this point that the ship comes in
contact with the land, including private berthing quays and independent terminals
among others.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD, 2003, p.39) 16 posited that the list of port facilities globally are innumerable
and vary significantly when compared with that of the port. This implies that security
assessment of the ports would not adequately cover port facilities which outnumber it
by far.

5.2.

Drawbacks of the ISPS Code

Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm with which the international community
accepted the ISPS Code in 2004 when it came into force with over 90 per cent of
States party to it, the maritime crimes continued to rise (IMB, 2009). Acts of piracy
and armed robbery against ships have increased tremendously globally, largely due
to the high rate of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia and
along the Horn of Africa region.

Although the Code is primarily a measure for

counter-terrorism onboard ships and port facilities; it can also be an effective
measure for counter-piracy and armed robbery against ships among others, which
presently portend maritime insecurity. However, the ISPS Code seems to have its
limitation in ensuring maritime security.
16

The OECD comprised of 30 developed countries and was formed in 1961 as a forum for discussion
of social, economic and development matters globally.
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Similar to the other international legal regimes existing before it, the ISPS Code has
some grey areas from the onset. The Code deals with security issues relating to only
shipping which include passenger ships, cargo ships of above 500 gross tonnage
and high speed craft.

However, it excluded some ships of less tonnage which

constitute a serious threat to maritime security. It may be recalled that the terrorist
attacks on MT Limburg and USS Cole were carried out using a boat as a vector in
each case. Other drawbacks of the Code include its restriction to deal with mobile
offshore drilling units (MODUs) and port facilities serving ships engaged in
international voyages.

There are several offshore and port facilities which are

excluded by this restriction, but are prone to maritime terrorist activities. This is one
of the drawbacks in the provisions of the ISPS Code.

Another drawback is that the Code provides a framework of requirements without
stipulating specific standards for satisfying those requirements. For example, the
Code has provisions for ships and port facilities to have security plans, security
officers and certain security equipment; but the Code leaves it up to individual
Contracting Governments to provide specific details. As a result, there is not a set of
minimum standards for the measures to be taken in ensuring maritime security from
acts of terrorism, piracy and illegal activities. The standards vary from one country to
another depending on how each country perceives its own maritime security risk.
Therefore, there are no established minimum standards for training to become a
“qualified” security officer, access and perimeter control, electronic surveillance,
guards and communication among others. What these drawbacks have done is to
underline the fact that the ISPS Code needs the maximum support from the national
law to be effective in combating terrorism and other maritime crimes. In fact it is
arguable, as the USA has demonstrated that the ISPS Code is a small but vital part
of a larger logistic chain in international trade.

5.3.

The United States Maritime Security Initiatives

In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA Coast Guard (USCG) was placed under the newly
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which consequently, developed
policies that cover an extensive range of activities in the maritime transport system.
According to Pallis et al (2008, p.236), these policies focus on ships, containers and
port facilities among others. Initially, it was seen that the USA adopted measures
largely supplementary to the ISPS Code and the emphasis was as far as possible on
the most extended application of the Code. Included in the new mandatory maritime
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security initiatives are the Maritime Transport Security Act 2002 (MTSA, 2002) and
the 24-hour Advance Manifest Rule. Other voluntary security programmes include
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Custom-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT).

The MTSA authorized the development and implementation of port security and
vessel tracking measures. It is in response to this that the IMO proposed the Long
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) which was adopted in May 2006 as an
amendment to the SOLAS Convention.

Looking at the USA maritime security

initiatives, they are similar to the international legal regimes. They are not a standalone system of initiatives, but they work in tandem and supplement one another. In
fact, the MTSA is seen as the USA version of the ISPS Code. In addition, the CSI
and C-TPAT are a further extension of the Code in the international trade supply
chain as shown at Figure 2.

Country of destination

IMO ISPS
CODE

US C-TPAT

Figure 2 - Scope of IMO and USA Security Initiatives in Container Logistics Chain
Source: OECD (2003). Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact.
Maritime Transport Committee

5.4.

Comité Maritime International Model National Law

The CMI (2008) is an international Non-governmental Organization (NGO) which
assists in modelling international maritime law to ensure uniform application in
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national law.

As mentioned earlier, the international community seems to have

experienced difficulty in uniformly interpreting acts of piracy and other maritime
crimes in terms of jurisdiction of the act, person and place. The traditional definition
of the act of piracy by UNCLOS could not ensure uniform understanding of the act in
member States; the definition is inadequate in addressing all issues of current
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

For example, the provisions of the high seas and two ships requirements in the act of
piracy could not help on this issue. Most of the acts of piracy and armed robbery
against ships are carried out within territorial waters and EEZ about 200 miles from
the coastline. Furthermore, in the implementation of the SUA Convention and ISPS
Code subsequently, references are made to the definitions of acts of piracy and other
maritime crimes among others in the provisions in UNCLOS, despite their
inadequacy. As result the traditional jurisdiction of the flag States in boarding ships
and arresting suspects in international shipping is maintained, regardless whether a
flag State is capable and willing to carry out this responsibility. However, the CMI
Model Law tries to define the act of piracy and other maritime crimes to cover all
issues raised by member States and to ensure that the content of the admiralty law is
adequately reflected in the national law. The Model Law is a private international law
from the CMI, which is a NGO and therefore it is not binding on member States.

5.5.

Maritime Security Operations

Inevitably, the inadequacy of the international regulatory regimes has resulted in
naval counter-terrorism and piracy campaigns. Over the years, the navies and coast
guards of the nations have carried out operations to secure SLOCs as well as ensure
maritime security in international and territorial waters. For instance, during the Cold
War era, warships from the USA-led-Western Bloc and Russian-led-Eastern Bloc
were frequently patrolling the seas respectively. This resulted in reducing the acts of
piracy and other maritime crimes to a minimum level.

However, at the end of the Cold war in the late 1980s, many nations withdraw the
presence of their navies from international waters as one of the dividends of the new
world order in peacetime and to reduce the cost of naval operations.

This

development seems to have ushered in an increase in acts of terrorism and piracy,
which were hitherto controlled adequately. Recently, the increase in acts of piracy
and armed robbery against ships as reported by IMB has provided a new challenge

37

to the navies of the world. Furthermore, the incident of 9/11 has witnessed the
formation of USA-led Naval Coalition Forces, as a Maritime Component Force, in the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

This is asymmetric warfare whereby the navies are more involved in constabulary
work. Some of the naval operations being conducted in the ongoing GWOT include
the USA-led Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in the Mediterranean Sea and Multinational Combined Task Force (CTF) in the Gulfs of Hormuz and Aden as well as the
European Union-led (EU) Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa. Undoubtedly, the
navies of the world would remain one of the vital instruments for enhancing maritime
security globally, but this could be hindered by the provisions in the Constitutions of
some member States which prohibit the use of military power for law enforcement
missions.

In discussing the requirements for the effective implementation of the ISPS Code
globally, some of the USA maritime security initiatives and the use of maritime
component Forces on enhancement of maritime security were also looked into. As
has always been the case, most international legislation is regulatory in nature and
therefore requires supporting domestic law for enforcement. Admittedly the USA is a
leading member of the developed nations and the country could easily overcome the
burden imposed by the requirements of the Code. Despite all these efforts from
international and national legislation, acts of piracy continue unabated globally as
shown in the chart at Appendix B on trends in acts of piracy. The navies of the world
and other law enforcement agencies are involved in combating piracy and maritime
terrorism in the Gulf of Aden, off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia as well as along
the Horn of Africa. Yet piracy attacks are increasing in this region as well as the Gulf
of Guinea according to the IMB Report of 2009. It seems there is some constraints
to the effectiveness of the ISPS Code and other legal regimes in these regions as will
be discussed subsequently.
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CHAPTER 6

CONSTRAINTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISPS CODE IN NIGERIA

Since January 2004, there have been some international events which have focused
on various aspects of maritime security in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.
Undoubtedly, the acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of
Somalia and along the Horn of Africa are on top the List of IMB’s Reports. Previously,
the top position used to be taken by the Southeast Asian countries along the Malacca
Strait. Also, the Gulf of Guinea was ranked as one of the most troubled waterways,
while occupying the second position as shown in the chart at Appendix C.

The Gulf of Guinea comprises of eleven coastal countries along the West and
Central African countries, with a total coastline of about 5500 kilometres. These
countries include Angola, Benin, Congo, Ghana and Nigeria among others. Recent
increase in acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships as indicated in Table 3,
and the deplorable state of maritime security in some of these countries has become
a major concern to the international community. Some researchers have estimated
that the Gulf of Guinea region would attract an investment of over USD10 billion in
the petroleum sector from 2005 to 2015 (Gilpin, 2007).

This will include an

investment in the region whereby the USA will imports about 20 per cent of the
petroleum oil from the region. 17 Additionally, with the new discovery of oil off the
coast of Ghana, the per cent of oil from the region would increase significantly.
However, this increase would depend on how the countries of this region, particularly
Nigeria would overcome the constraints in implementing the international legal
regimes in its’ geographical area of responsibility, to ensure maritime security.

17

Currently, USA imports about 17 per cent of oil from the West and Central African countries and it
accounts to 80 per cent of USA total investment in the African continent.
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Table 3 - Hotspot Areas in the Gulf of Guinea for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships
Number of Actual and Attempted Attacks Annually

Ser
(a)

Gulf of
Guinea
Country
(b)

1.

Angola

1

3

1

-

3

-

-

4

1

2

2.

Cameroon

3

2

7

5

2

4

2

1

-

2

3.

Ghana

2

2

5

5

3

5

3

3

1

7

4.

Guinea

6

6

3

2

4

5

1

4

2

0

5.

Ivory Coast

5

5

9

5

2

4

3

1

-

3

6.

Nigeria

12

9

19

14

39

28

16

12

42

40

7.

Senegal

1

-

1

3

8

5

-

-

-

-

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(l)

Source: IMB Yearly Reports from January 1999 to January 2009.

Though many of these countries are signatories to most relevant international
conventions on maritime security, very few have taken concrete measures to ratify
and domesticate these conventions.

For example, in Nigeria none of the

international regulatory legislation has been supported with national enforcing
legislation.

Studies have shown that the international instruments for enhancing

maritime security such as SOLAS 1974 As Amended, SUA Convention 2005 and
ISPS Code are invoked by the Administration in Nigeria in-situ without their
domestication. This is in contrary to the IMO recommendation that member States
nationalize existing international legislation. As a result, the provisions in the legal
instruments for ensuring maritime security are difficult to implement in the Gulf of
Guinea region. In carrying out this Study, there are many constraints which have
been identified to hinder effective implementation of the maritime rules and
regulations in Nigeria. These constraints include high cost of implementing the ISPS
Code, high level of corruption in Government and poor governance, lack of resources,
insufficient security personnel, inadequate personnel training, substandard flag of
convenience and high sensitivity of territorial water sovereignty.

Others are

insufficient maritime domain awareness, lack of regional cooperation and poor
equipment of the Naval Force.
6.1.

High Cost

The ISPS Code imposes significant additional costs on the Contracting Governments
and ship-owners to implement, which includes the purchase of equipment and having
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to employ more personnel as security officers. 18

According to the OECD Report

(2003, p.2), the initial burden on all ship operators worldwide is estimated to be at
least USD1,279 million and USD 730 million per year thereafter, for additional
manpower and security-related equipment.

The countries of the Gulf of Guinea are among the developing countries of the world.
Some of the countries do not have the financial capability to spend a large amount of
money on the security of merchant shipping annually. Consequently, the effort of
Nigeria to implement the provisions of the ISPS Code in her geographical area of
responsibility is being hindered by the high cost of compliance.

6.2.

High Level of Corruption in the Governments

According to the reports of the Transparency International (2008), there is high level
of corruption of officials of the Governments in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria is among
the countries in the region that are worse affected in corrupt practices according to
the report.

Definitely, it would be difficult to ensure effective implementation of

maritime security regimes in a corrupt environment. However, the issue of corruption
is being addressed in the Gulf of Guinea countries. For example, the Independent
Corrupt Practice and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have been established in Nigeria for the
purpose of eradicating corruption.

A direct consequence of corruption is the poor governance in the West and Central
African countries. As a result of this, some of countries have tended towards fail
States status, which is a trademark for a lawless society and haven for criminal
activities. For example, petroleum and gas resources have been discovered in large
quantity off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria ranks the sixth largest exporter of
crude oil in the world (Rilwanu, 2009). Most of the facilities for the oil production are
off-shore and the countries in this region lack sufficient maritime security operatives,
which has significantly facilitated illegal bunkering. As a result, the money realized
from the illegal bunkering and other maritime crimes is being used by militant groups
in Niger-Delta such as MEND and Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF) to
finance terrorism as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships.

18

Katrin Berkenkopf also reflected this view as that of a German tramp owner in the Lloyd’s List
online, 28 October 2004.
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6.3.

Lack of Resources

According to IMO Reports (2008), the countries of Gulf of the Guinea are yet to fully
comply with the standards for port safety and security provisions in ISPS Code and
the other regimes due to lack of resources. For example, there are some resources
needed in the ports for the effective implementation of the ISPS Code.

These

include ships, security personnel, vessel traffic services (VTS) centre, AIS, LRIT and
other surveillance equipment. In some countries in the Gulf of Guinea, the existing
infrastructure is weak while in others the infrastructure is lacking. As a result, the
implementation of the existing international legal regimes in this sub-region is
hindered. However, in these countries such as Angola, Ghana and Nigeria where
the infrastructure is weak, efforts are being made to repair, upgrade and replace
them appropriately.

6.4.

Inadequate Training of Personnel

Adequate training of personnel is essential for effective and efficient maritime
security planning as well as operation.

However, the training of personnel in

maritime security is inadequate in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.

The

Governments of these countries do not have the political will and financial resources
for the training of personnel in the security of international shipping. It results from
the fact that the ISPS Code does not specify the minimum standard of training that
would be required for the security operators. In this analysis, the personnel training
not only includes the security officers, but also the crew members, as experience has
shown that it is often crew members of a fairly low rank and limited training that will
attempt to implement the Code (Raymond, 2005, p.200).
6.5.

Substandard Flags of Convenience

Some of the ships involved in the breach of maritime security are registered in
developing countries globally and this includes countries in the Gulf of Guinea.
Recently, the situation is that a ship-owner residing in Europe could fly the flag of
convenience of Liberia in West Africa, resulting from an inability of the ship to fulfil
the stringent requirements in the provisions of the ISPS Code in Europe and other
developed nations. However, this has made the countries of West Africa register and
own substandard ships.

It is on record that about 85 per cent of the vessels
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registered in the Gulf of Guinea countries are above 20 years, making them
susceptible to accidents and insecurity.

6.6.

High Sensitivity of Territorial Water Sovereignty

Enduring disputes over maritime boundaries could impair maritime security globally.
This has been the case with some countries in the Gulf of Guinea. It was observed
that as a result of the disputes, some countries in the sub-region have difficulties to
address shared security concerns in a collaborative manner.

Among the major

maritime disputes in the Gulf of Guinea are those between Cameroon and Nigeria
over the Bakassi Peninsular as well as between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea
over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River. Another dispute is also between
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon over the Mbane Island and Corisco Bay boundaries.
Murphy (2007, p.166) have observed that pirates have shown no propensity to
respect national boundaries that are disputed, as is the case with the countries in the
Gulf of Guinea.

Furthermore, one of the consequences of the boundary disputes is the lack of
cooperation among neighbouring coastal States in the region which tends to hinder
effective maritime security. For example, some countries would find it difficult to
address shared security concerns in partnership with the other countries in the region.
This tends to impair the effectiveness of the international legislation in this region.
6.7.

Insufficient Maritime Domain Awareness

The need for “maritime domain awareness” (MDA) has been a central focus in the
GWOT. The MDA provides early knowledge of what is happening in the maritime
environment, including details of cargoes and people heading inward towards to
ports.

This is very useful in the conduct of naval operations as well as in the

provision of maritime and port security. However, there is evidence that criminal
organizations are resorting to deception to circumvent the usefulness of the MDA
approach to maritime security. In this case, it is essential that the MDA combines
with intelligence gathering from military intelligence, national intelligence and other
recognized intelligence agencies.

Undoubtedly, there is insufficient awareness in the maritime domain of the Gulf of
Guinea countries. Some of the old ships in this region are SOLAS Convention non-
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compliance and therefore could not supply sufficient information regarding their
identification. Also, the military and national intelligence of these countries have
insufficient data concerning the security information of the old ships as well as from
deceptions by criminal ships in the Gulf of Guinea.

6.8.

Poorly Equipped Naval Force

Modern naval forces in definitional terms should be able to upgrade equipment and
existing platforms as well as introduce new platforms into the inventory. This also
includes the adoption of new operational concepts for navies to aid civil authorities in
peacetime and in conducting war. A well-equipped naval force is a vital component
in the operational plan for the enforcement of maritime security in some geographical
areas such as the Gulf of Guinea.

Nigeria has the largest navy with an air arm as well as an Order of Battle (ORBAT)
covering large percentage of the entire sub-region. Although the Nigerian Navy (NN)
and the other navies in the region are employed for Coast Guard duties by the
National Law, however, these navies are poorly equipped. As a result of this, there
has been insufficient patrolling of the territorial waters by the coastal States in
performing of the port States control duties (Gilpin, 2007). The Gulf of Guinea is
experiencing shortage of basic functioning surveillance systems, material and trained
personnel for the navies, coast guards and other law enforcement agencies.
Obviously, poorly equipped navies and enforcement agencies have made the
implementation of maritime security regimes ineffective in the region. Having looked
at the constraints in the implementation of the ISPS Code and the other legal
regimes in the Gulf of Guinea and particularly in Nigeria, the subsequent section
would consider strategic measures being taken for effective implementation of the
Code to enhance maritime security.
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CHAPTER 7

STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
An effective ISPS Code is a requirement in ensuring maritime security globally. In
the Gulf of Guinea, neighbouring coastal countries should take measures to ensure
that the provisions in the Code are effectively carried out. As was discussed earlier,
some of the provisions in the ISPS Code do not specify the standards of the
requirements for its implementation.

Instead, they are being left to individual

Contracting Governments to determine and apply accordingly.

For example,

although the Code and other legal regimes criminalize the acts of terrorism and
piracy, the legislation did not specify standard courts of jurisdiction or punishments to
be awarded to the perpetrators.

Another example is the provision in the Code specifying the need for security officers
to be onboard ships and port facilities. Again the Code does not specify the standard
qualifications and training for security officers. However, it specifies that security
officers should receive training through seminars, drills and exercises. Nevertheless,
it was left on individual shipping companies to decide the extent and standard of the
training for ships’ security officer. Currently, the incident of pirate attacks on USAflagged MV Maersk Alabama on April 2009 underlined the importance of strategic
training in security issues for ship crew. It is worth noting that after the pirates had
attacked and boarded the ship on the high seas in the Indian Ocean, the efforts of
the crew-members of the Maersk Alabama that helped to retake control of the ship in
the Horn of Africa waters.

All the requirements in the ISPS Code that are not specified were left for the
Contracting Countries to work out in detail and implement accordingly. Early on, the
degree of each State concerned with matters of terrorism and piracy have varied
from one State to another. In fact some, like the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, do
not make terrorism and piracy a priority as a threat to maritime security.

In fact, in

Nigeria, there is no National Law against acts of terrorism and piracy. However, the
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perpetrators of these criminal acts could be tried with other Penal Code of the
National Laws bordering on murder, armed robbery and possession of illegal firearms
among others. Faced with the difficulties in enforcing the ISPS Code in Nigeria, some
strategies have been identified which may make the Code effective within the region.
However, in the absent of corruption, these strategies include the domestication of
international legislation, maritime security tax collection, a maritime domain
awareness initiative and a regional maritime security initiative. Others are ships-port
facilities security initiatives, manpower training developments, the use of armed
escorts onboard ships and the deployment of a rapid reaction Naval Force.

7.1.

Domestication of International Legislation

Most of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea are party signatory to the international
legislation such as UNCLOS, SUA Convention and ISPS Code. The ISPS Code is a
vital instrument for ensuring the security of ships and port facilities from acts of
terrorism, piracy and other maritime crimes. Despite their importance to maritime
security, certain provisions in these international legal regimes have not been
domesticated in the National Laws of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea.

This

implies that the Criminal Code of these countries could not treat acts of terrorism and
piracy as criminal offences in itself.

For example in Nigeria, acts of terrorism and piracy are not defined by the Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria (LFN); therefore these acts could not be prosecuted in any
of the law courts in Nigeria. However, LFN declares it a criminal offence for murder,
arson, illegal possession of firearms and explosives which are punishable by the law
courts in Nigeria. This implies that terrorists and pirates could be prosecuted by
these complementary acts to their criminal offences. With the increase in acts of
terrorism and piracy in this region, with Nigerian waters having the second highest
number of attacks in 2008, second only to Somalia waters (IMB, 2009); there is a
need for the codification of these offences in the National Laws. This strategy will
directly treat acts of terrorism and piracy as criminal offences; thereby ensure
effective implementation of ISPS Code in the Gulf of Guinea.

7.2.

Provision for Special Maritime Security Tax

The Governments of coastal countries have proposed a special tax on International
shipping to ensure maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. As earlier stated the
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OECD (2003) has estimated the combined capital cost of implementing the ISPS
Code by ship operators is about US$1,279 million, while the combined running cost
is about $730 million annually. These amounts are by far more than the annual
budgetary expenditure of some of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea. For example,
the Togo and Benin total budget expenditures for the year 2008 are about $554
million and $1,226 million respectively (CIA, 2008).

This implies that some of the

countries do not have the funds to off-set the financial burden for fulfilling the
requirements of effective ISPS Code implementation in the region.

However, it is worthwhile that the countries in the Gulf of Guinea raise the required
funds through special maritime security tax arrangements from shipping activities.
From experience, the cost benefit of taking measures in the form of having effective
ISPS Code implementation, by far outweighs the one of not taking adequate
measures which would result in ineffective ISPS Code. According to Rilwanu (2009),
Nigeria, the sixth largest oil producer in the world, presently loses about 1.0 million oil
barrels per day (mbpd) from her estimated target of 2.2 mbpd due to terrorist attacks
from militant groups in the Niger Delta. Since about 95 per cent of the country’s
revenue is from crude oil exportation, it follows that the Nigerian annual income has
been halved as a result of the insecurity in her territorial waters in the region.
Therefore, the proposed special tax on shipping activities for maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea is a strategic measure to ensure the availability of funding for effective
ISPS Code implementation.

7.3.

Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative

The USA is introducing the MDA Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea through bilateral and
multilateral agreements.

As mentioned earlier, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the

regions in the world where shipping activities are mostly ungovernable and
unregulated. This has been attributed to insufficient MDA in the region, which is
making the area prone to maritime crimes. However, with American strategic interest
in the oil from this region, coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea are being engaged in
the MDA programmes organized by the USA Navy and USCG.

For example, the USA Navy is in partnership with Nigeria Navy (NN) in establishing
Regional Maritime Awareness capability (RMAC) centre in Nigeria.

This RMAC

centre has LRIT systems covering over 45 nm area of the sea, within the range of
which all shipping activities in the Nigerian Waters could be monitored and controlled
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to enhance maritime security.

For this strategy to succeed, there is a need for

appropriate sharing of information between the NN and law enforcement agencies on
illegal shipping activities in the MDA.
7.4.

Regional Maritime Cooperation

Given the trans-national character of maritime security threats, there is a need for the
establishment of regional maritime cooperation agreements to check the menace of
the acts terrorism and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

Though, the USA in the

aftermath of 9/11 introduced a series of unilateral security measures to combat
maritime terrorism within its geographical area of responsibility, these were ad-hoc
measures in ensuring maritime security.

However, these measures are more

stringent than the ones provided by the existing maritime regulations.

The

international community in adopting some of these security initiatives has stated that
the best result is achieved when the measures are taken through bilateral,
multilateral and regional cooperation.

In the Gulf of Guinea, the littoral States high sensitivity of territorial waters
sovereignty will have to be de-emphasized for the sake of more effective regional
cooperation in combating maritime security threats.

For example, in the current

protocol, it would be difficult for a naval ship, being the only asset available on-scene,
to continue its hot pursuit of a pirate or suspected terrorist, once the suspect enters
another State’s territorial waters.

Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea has multiple

bordering countries and joining sovereign littoral States, therefore there is the need
for regional cooperation among these countries on ensuring maritime security within
the region.

Hence, the countries in the Gulf of Guinea have established regional organizations
such as the maritime Organization for West and Central African States (MOWCA)
and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), to promote regional cooperation among
the countries. Additionally, there is an on-going bilateral agreement between
Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria in the sharing of their maritime assets to ensure
security in the Gulf of Guinea. Definitely, the strategy of regional cooperation would
enhance maritime security and impact on effective ISPS Code implementation and
other security instruments within the region.
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7.5.

Ship-Port Facilities Security Initiatives

The increasing acts of terrorism as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships
have necessitated the stakeholders in the shipping industry to adopt some strategies
in securing ships and port facilities. Among these strategies are perimeter fencing,
the provision of closed circuit television (CCTV) and armed guards onboard.

In

perimeter fencing, the situation at seaports is quite different from that in airports. An
airport is surrounded by land and can easily be fenced-in for security purposes.

On the other hand, a seaport is surrounded by land and water; the land side of the
port can easily be fenced-in while it is practically impossible to fence-in the waterside
of the port. Also, in the use of wire fenced ships to deter unlawful boarding of the
ship, these fences should not obstruct safety escape passages onboard. CCTV no
doubt would increase the surveillance capability of the security zone in the vicinity.
However, when borne on ships, adequate care has to be taken to ensure that it does
not interfere with the ship’s navigation system or cause distraction to the watch
keepers onboard.

7.6.

Weapons Control onboard Ships

In some countries with restrictive gun laws such as Indonesia and Malaysia in
Southeast Asia, firearms and armed guards are permitted onboard merchant ships
and ports in the Straits of Malacca. It is worth noting that this is a limited strategic
approach in ensuring security of ships and port facilities. In the Gulf of Guinea, the
countries prohibit the carriage and use of firearms for security of shipping activities
unconditionally. Therefore, it is unlikely that these countries would allow ships with
unlawful possession of firearms into their ports. Furthermore, the IMO and the EU
strictly discourage the use of firearms onboard merchant vessels on the premise that
it could escalate armed conflict with the pirates and terrorists.

7.7.

Manpower Development Training

Personnel recruitment, retention, development and training are vital for the
successful implementation of the provisions in the ISPS Code on enhancing maritime
security. As mentioned above, the ISPS Code does not specify a uniform standard
of training for security personnel. This is being left for individual countries to decide
upon the level of training based on their own risk evaluation. Recently, the Gulf of
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Guinea is reported to be a very high risk zone in international shipping (IMB, 2009).
The region is ranking second to the Gulf of Aden off Somalia and along the Horn of
Africa, having displaced the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia to the third place on
the list. In the light of this development, there is a need for capacity building in the
recruiting, retaining and training of security personnel in the Gulf of Guinea.

Countries in the Gulf of Guinea have entered into bilateral and multilateral
agreements with the USA, EU and the international community on ways developing
capacity building for the security personnel in the region.

The capacity building

would involve recruitment, training and retention of the ship security personnel in
accordance with the provisions in the ISPS Code. As a result of the agreements,
several workshops such as “train the trainers” workshops on maritime security are
being conducted in Gabon, Ghana and Nigeria. Furthermore, the USCG and the US
Naval Forces in Europe have been instrumental in the capacity building by
conducting regular sea training exercises for the security personnel in this region.
Therefore, the strategy of manpower training would enhance the skill and expertise of
security operators in the region, thereby ensuring effective implementation of the
ISPS Code and other regimes.

7.8.

Deployment of Naval Task Forces

High-risk waters around the world would necessitate the use of naval forces in the
support of civil authorities to ensure maritime security. This has been the situation
with the GWOT in “hotspot areas” such as the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Hormuz, Gulf of
Persia, Mediterranean Sea and Strait of Malacca. Presently, there are multinational
coalition forces with the mandate of the UN and led by the US Navy in “Operation
Active Endeavour” and regional forces led by EU in “Operation Atalanta” which are to
enhance the maritime security in the “hot spot” areas worldwide. However, it is worth
noting that these formidable Naval Forces were primarily deployed as a counterterrorism measure in GWOT, but the counter-piracy measure has been included
secondarily due to the worsened situation in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somali.
This seems to have secured SLOCs in the region from piratical attacks on
international shipping.

However, the situation in the Gulf of Guinea does not warrant similar multinational
naval force for patrolling the waters in the region. Nevertheless, the presence of
regional navies is needed to detect and deter maritime crimes. These naval forces
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are to have capability of interdicting and boarding vessels suspected of illegal
activities. Currently, the patrolling of the Gulf of Guinea by the regional navies has
been inadequate. As a result their waters are improperly governed and secured,
thereby making the areas susceptible for maritime crimes. On realization of this
weakness in the region among other considerations, the USA has proposed the
establishment of African Command Force (AFRICOM). Undoubtedly, well integrated
navies in the region into the AFRICOM, such as the proposed Gulf of Guinea Guards
(GGG) will ensure improved infrastructure for these navies which would increase
their effectiveness in patrolling their territorial waters to enhance maritime security.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1.

Conclusion

The non-uniformity in the implementation of the international regulatory regimes by
member States is attributed to the weaknesses in the definitions provided by the
international regulations. Thus, there have been different interpretations of these
provisions in the national legislations of member States. The significant variation in
the standard of maritime security globally, has resulted in the increase of global acts
of terrorism and piracy in the last fifteen years.

This study identifies the motives of acts of terrorism and piracy as being political and
financial gains respectively. Furthermore, it establishes the human and economic
impacts of these criminal acts on ships and ports. Today’s use of sophisticated and
lethal small arms as different from the traditional knives, crowbars and daggers used
in the past has made pirates adamant during negotiations. In addition, the pirates
have demanded high ransoms for the release of their victims. The money raised
from acts of piracy has been linked with the funding of terrorism in some cases.
The existing maritime security regimes include the UNCLOS, SOLAS and SUA
Conventions and the ISPS Code; all these have been ineffective in combating acts of
terrorism and piracy. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness was contributed from the fact
that their risk assessment has been based on safety measures. This dissertation
concludes that in combating terrorism, the risk assessment should be based on
security measures instead of safety measures.

The ISPS Code is based on maritime security assessment which is seen as
appropriate for combating terrorism. Nevertheless, the high cost of implementing the
Code has made it difficult for developing countries to adopt it. In the other cases
examined, the ineffectiveness of the international regulations has resulted in the
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development of the USA Maritime Security Initiatives, CMI Model Law and
establishment of Maritime Component Force for the GWOT.
Furthermore, this study identifies contributing factors for the lack of effectiveness of
the ISPS Code on enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea over a period
of 10 years to be that of corruption in government and failure of nationalizing
international law. This has resulted in the inadequacy of national law to address the
issues of terrorism and piracy as well as a lack of maritime security infrastructure in
the Gulf of Guinea countries. Others are the lack of regional cooperation between
the countries and the poor equipment of the Navies and Coast Guards in the region.
The presence of the regional Navies at sea for the purposes of patrolling has been
rare, thus making the territorial waters of this region unregulated and ungovernable.

With the establishment of good governance in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea,
this study suggests therefore that the proper domestication of the international
regimes on maritime security is needed for the effective implementation of maritime
law in the region. Furthermore, with appropriate maritime tax collection, adequate
funds are to be raised in off-setting the high cost of implementing maritime security
regulations within the region.

In partnership with Nigeria, the USA has played an important role in introducing
RMAC to the Gulf of Guinea region. This system provides the LRIT units which has
a wider coverage area than the AIS units, however it was stated that effective
utilization of them would enhance maritime security in the region. Furthermore, the
international community recommendation on the need for regional cooperation in
ensuring effective implementation of security regimes has been adopted within the
region. As a result, the region has established MOWCA and GGC which have been
promoting regional cooperation initiatives among the countries in the region to
enhance maritime security.

This study has indicated that ships and port facilities security initiatives contributed in
combating the menace of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

The

initiatives included the measures on perimeter fencing, provisions of CCTV and
armed guards for merchant ships. However, it was indicated that the international
community has discouraged the use of firearms and armed guards in combating
piracy.
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Training and retention of security personnel are vital measures taken in adequate
capacity building to ensure effective implementation of maritime security regimes.
Some training initiatives in the region by the US Naval Forces in Europe, USCG, RN
and EU have been identified to involve workshops and sea exercises in the Gulf of
Guinea. In addition, this study stresses the important of a viable Naval Force in
ensuring maritime security and the Force has been identified to be lacking in the Gulf
of Guinea countries. Furthermore, the lack of any presence of a regional Naval
Force which has resulted in the irregular patrolling of the Gulf of Guinea waters, has
made it unregulated as well as ungovernable and therefore a breach of maritime
security.

8.2.

Recommendations

To combat acts of terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships thereby
ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, it is recommended that:
¾ The international community should define sufficiently, the provisions of the
acts of piracy and terrorism in the UNCLOS, SUA Convention and ISPS Code.
¾ Gulf of Guinea countries should eliminate corrupt practices to enthrone good
governance within the region.
¾ International regimes on maritime security should be domesticated in the Gulf
of Guinea.
¾ CMI Model Law should be used for uniformly standardising domestic maritime
security law in the Gulf of Guinea.
¾ A special maritime security tax should be collected from international shipping
in the Gulf of Guinea to off-set cost of implementing maritime law.
¾ Regional cooperation for maritime security should be adhered to by the
countries in the Gulf of Guinea.
¾ Sovereignty of a nation in the Gulf of Guinea should not be a breach of
maritime security in the region.
¾ Adequate LRIT and AIS systems should be provided in the Gulf of Guinea.
¾ Gulf of Guinea countries should embark on manpower training as well as the
development of security personnel.
¾ Regional Navies in the Gulf of Guinea should be patrolling the waters in the
region regularly.
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APPENDIX A
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS ATTACKS FROM 1994 T0 2008
Number of actual and attempted attacks annually
Ser Regional Location
(a)
1.

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(k)

(l)

(m)

(o)

(p)

(q)

(r)

(s)

(b)
Africa/Gulf of Guinea

58

Horn of Africa

5

7

20

86

32

41

45

66

56

72

63

35

41

76

98

2.

Americas

11

21

32

37

35

28

39

21

65

72

45

25

29

21

14

3.

Indian Sub-continent

3

16

24

37

22

45

93

53

52

87

32

36

53

30

23

4.

Middle East/Red Sea
1

14

5

10

9

14

25

23

22

24

13

57

22

48

111

Far East

70

118

141

111

99

167

263

169

170

189

173

122

88

80

65

6.

Rest of the World

-

13

6

17

5

5

4

3

5

1

3

1

6

8

2

7.

Total Annual Attacks

90

188

228

248

202

300

469

335

370

445

329

276

239

263

293

Gulf of Aden/Yemen
5.

Southeast Asia/

Source: Extract from IMB Annual reports from January 1994 to December 2008
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Annual Trends in Overall Actual and Attempted Piratical Attacks from 1994 to 2008 Worldwide
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Source: IMB Annual Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships from 1994 to 2009.
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150
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Source: IMB Annual Reports from 1994 to 2009.
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APPENDIX C

HOTSPOT AREAS CONTRIBUTING OVER 70 PER CENT OF GLOBAL PIRATICAL ATTACKS FROM 1994 TO 2008
Number of actual and attempted attacks annually
Ser Hotspot Areas
(a)

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(k)

(l)

(m)

(o)

(p)

(q)

(r)

(s)

(b)

1.

Bangladesh

2

2

4

9

9

25

55

25

32

58

17

21

47

15

12

2.

Gulf of Aden/Yemen

-

-

1

5

-

-

14

12

17

18

8

10

10

16

92

3.

Indonesia

22

33

57

47

60

115

119

91

103

121

94

79

50

43

28

4.

Gulf of Guinea/Nigeria

-

1

4

9

3

12

9

19

14

39

28

16

12

42

40

5.

Somalia

1

14

4

5

9

14

9

8

6

3

2

35

10

31

19

6.

Tanzania

1

2

3

4

3

3

2

7

3

5

2

7

9

11

14

7.

Vietnam

2

4

-

4

-

2

6

8

12

15

4

10

3

5

11

8.

Total Annual Attacks

28

56

73

83

84

171

214

170

187

262

155

178

141

163

216

9.

Per cent Overall
31

30

32

33

42

57

46

51

51

59

47

64

60

62

74

Annually (approx)

Source: IMB Annual reports from January 1994 to December 2008
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Trends in Selected Hotspot Areas in the Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships from 2004
to 2008
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2005

Somalia
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Chart Showing the Distribution of the Incidents of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in
Selected Hotspots Region/Country Contributing 70 Per cent Overall
Vietnam, 11

Bangladesh, 12

Tanzania, 18

Somalia, 19

Gulf of Aden, 92

Nigeria, 40
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Indonesia, 28
Source: IMB Annual Reports from 1994 to 2009.
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